·
People
v Figueroa-Norse (KA 12-00137) –
4AD rejects D’s argument that the lower court should have suppressed statements
she made to police because she was not read the Miranda warnings. 4AD finds that D was not in custody during the
interrogation and warnings were therefore not required. D was interrogated in
the hospital where the victim, D’s eight-year-old foster child, was being
treated. Although the interrogation took place over the course of 10 hours, the
questioning was not continuous. D was given breaks to go to the bathroom and to
get a drink. D was able to contact family members by telephone, and at one
point she left the hospital to retrieve an items from her car, and then
returned. 4AD also notes that the questioning was investigatory rather than
accusatory, D was not restrained, and she was never told that she was required
to answer questions.
·
People
v Mobley (KA 10-01203) – 4AD reverses D’s conviction. The lower court
should have suppressed the gun police found on D’s person as well as statements
because police seized D without the requisite reasonable suspicion. Police
observed D standing with a group of people in an allegedly high-crime area of
Rochester. The officer saw D cup an item in his hand as he adjusted his
clothing. That officer then instructed another unit to stop D. As that unit
approached, D began walking away. He was told to stop and show his hands. D
then placed the item he had in his hand into his back pocket. Police stopped
him, found a cell phone in the back pocket, and a further pat-frisk yielded a
gun. 4AD explains that D’s conduct was at all times innocuous, and did not give
rise to reasonable suspicion. The fact that D was in a high crime area, had
reached for his right side, and had placed a cell phone in his back pocket was
insufficient. Police did not see the outline of a gun, or hear the audible
click of a magazine, nor did they indicate that they felt they were in danger.
·
People
v Myhand (KA 10-01033) – 4AD finds that the lower court correctly ruled
that the search warrant to search D’s residence was supported by probable cause
(PC). PC was established by evidence regarding three separate drug
transactions. The first transaction involved a controlled buy by a confidential
informant (CI) at D’s old residence. The second and third transactions also
involved the CI, but the CI gave money to an “unwitting participant” (UP), who
then purchased drugs at D’s new residence. 4AD finds that PC was established
without regard to any hearsay evidence, because police searched the CI before
each transaction and gave him money, and they observed the CI and the UP go to
D’s residence each time. During the third transaction, police observed the UP
leaving D’s residence along with D. 4AD further concludes that even if the
hearsay evidence must be considered to find PC, then under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, both the CI and
UP were reliable and had a sufficient basis for their knowledge. 4AD notes in
particular that the UP’s statements to the CI were against his penal interest,
and thus there was good reason to believe what UP said.
