Monday, August 29, 2011

Case Summaries - Fourth Department Decisions Released on August 19, 2011


·        People v Frankline (KA 10-01632) – 4AD first rejected D’s argument that the verdict with respect to the kidnapping counts was against the weight of the evidence because the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he restrained the victim.  Victim testified that she was held against her will by D, her ex-boyfriend, in his apartment, where he repeatedly hit and kicked her while her arms and legs were bound with wire.  D also poured gasoline on victim and threatened to set her on fire if she did not have anal intercourse with him.  Although there may have been periods during which victim was not restrained, jury could have found that she was effectively restrained by D’s threats to harm her if she attempted to leave.  There was also evidence corroborating D’s story, and the jury was entitled to credit her testimony over D’s.

4AD next rejected D’s contention that the lower court’s decision to permit the People to present evidence of subsequent crimes committed by D against the same victim effectively deprived D of his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to the subsequent crimes.  The argument was not preserved, but in any event, the People were prohibited from cross-examining D regarding these crimes and they were admissible under People v Molineux.

Finally, 4AD found that the lower court properly concluded that the victim had apparent authority to consent to the search of D’s apartment.  Although she no longer lived there, the search was conducted during the month for which the victim had paid rent, the utilities were still in her name, she retained the key to the apartment, and had left her cloths there.

Monday, May 2, 2011

HLAS obtains reversal in People v Lugo-Rosado based on faulty jury charge

Philip Rothschild

In People v Lugo-Rosado (2011 NY Slip Op 3405 [4th Dept 2011]), the Fourth Department reversed a twenty year old conspiracy conviction, finding that the County Court (Cunningham) committed error in its reasonable doubt charge.  Though not illuminated in the decision, the facts were particularly egregious in this case as the trial court diluted the People’s burden of proof in three separate ways: defining reasonable doubt as requiring a “good sound substantial reason; requiring that jurors articulate the basis of their doubt to fellow jurors; and emphasizing the problems the prosecution had in proving their case.  In the past, a combination of any two of those errors has been deemed sufficient to warrant reversal, even absent objection.  Though not explicit, there is reason to believe that the court now views such charging errors as a defective “mode of proceeding” not requiring preservation. The first clue is that the court essentially ignored the lack of objection by defense counsel at trial, an issue raised by the prosecution on appeal.  The second was the Appellate Division's inclusion of Sullivan v Louisiana (508 US 275 [1993]), where the Supreme Court found reasonable doubt charges not amenable to harmless error analysis.