HLAS obtains reversal in People v Lugo-Rosado based on faulty jury charge

Philip Rothschild

In People v Lugo-Rosado (2011 NY Slip Op 3405 [4th Dept 2011]), the Fourth Department reversed a twenty year old conspiracy conviction, finding that the County Court (Cunningham) committed error in its reasonable doubt charge.  Though not illuminated in the decision, the facts were particularly egregious in this case as the trial court diluted the People’s burden of proof in three separate ways: defining reasonable doubt as requiring a “good sound substantial reason”; requiring that jurors articulate the basis of their doubt to fellow jurors; and emphasizing the problems the prosecution had in proving their case.  In the past, a combination of any two of those errors has been deemed sufficient to warrant reversal, even absent objection.  Though not explicit, there is reason to believe that the court now views such charging errors as a defective “mode of proceeding” not requiring preservation. The first clue is that the court essentially ignored the lack of objection by defense counsel at trial, an issue raised by the prosecution on appeal.  The second was the Appellate Division's inclusion of Sullivan v Louisiana (508 US 275 [1993]), where the Supreme Court found reasonable doubt charges not amenable to harmless error analysis.