Criminal Case Summaries:
·
People
v Arnold (KA 06-03041) – 4AD finds D’s argument that the lower court
failed to comply with People v O’Rama
and CPL 310.30 with regard to the handling of a certain jury note is
unpreserved for review. Although the court failed to read the note to counsel
outside the presence of the jury, it read the note verbatim in the presence of
the jury, defense counsel, and D. Not all departures from the procedures set forth
by the Court of Appeals in O’Rama
constitute mode of proceedings errors, and here, where counsel knew the
contents of the note and the court’s intended response, an objection was
required to preserve the issue.
·
People
v Lemery (KA 12-02387) – 4AD finds that the lower court properly
precluded expert testimony regarding the effects of chemotherapy treatments on
D’s mental capacity. D wanted to introduce such testimony to show that he had a
diminished capacity that prevented him from understanding what he was saying
during an inculpatory conversation with the victim. 4AD finds that evaluating
the recorded conversations was “within the ken of the typical juror”, and in
any event, the expert was unable to testify to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the cause of D’s purported mental deficits were the chemotherapy
treatments.
·
People
v Robinson (KA 04-02820) – 4AD reverses D’s conviction, upon a plea of
guilty, of second degree murder, because D’s statements during the plea
colloquy casted significant doubt upon his guilt, and the lower court failed to
conduct a further inquiry. D stated during the colloquy that he acted
“recklessly” when he stabbed his wife during a struggle. 4AD finds that this
statement suggests that D did not act with depraved indifference to human life.
Under these circumstances, the lower court should have asked further questions
to ensure that D’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
·
People
v Sigl (KA 09-01149) – 4AD rejects D’s argument that his prosecution
for burglary and sodomy was time-barred. Under CPL 30.10, the statute of
limitations is tolled where the defendant’s whereabouts are unknown and he or
she cannot be found with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Here, D’s identity
as the assailant could not be determined until his DNA, which was obtained in
connection with an unrelated arrest in 2007, was matched to semen found at the
crime scene.
·
People
v Stevenson (KA 12-00470) – 4AD reverses D’s conviction, upon a guilty
plea, of first degree rape, because he pled to a jurisdictionally defective
superior court information (SCI). D was arraigned on a felony complaint for
rape with respect to one victim, but after he waived indictment, the SCI was
amended to charge D with the rape of a second victim. D pled guilty to rape
with respect to the second victim. 4AD first notes that D’s contention that the
SCI was jurisdictionally defective does not require preservation and survives
the valid waiver of appeal. 4AD then concludes that the SCI was defective,
because D was not being held for action of a grand jury on the charge in the
amended SCI because “it was not an offense charged in the felony complaint or a
lesser-included offense of an offense charged in the felony complaint”.
·
People
v Turner (KA 11-01156) – D argued that she did not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently plead guilty because the lower court failed to
advise her that her sentence would include a 5-year period of post-release
supervision—i.e., the lower court committed a Catu error. 4AD finds that the argument is not preserved. While Catu errors generally do not require
preservation, 4AD finds that here, D was informed of the term of PRS before
sentence was imposed. D then confirmed that she had the opportunity to discuss
the term of PRS with counsel, and further indicated that she still wished to go
ahead with sentencing. Under these circumstances, 4AD finds that D could have
sought the relief she now seeks from the lower court, and thus preservation was
required.
Sconiers and
Martoche, JJ., dissent, and conclude that preservation was not required. The
dissent finds that D was not informed of the PRS component of the sentence at
“the outset of the sentencing proceeding”. Instead, she was not made aware of
the PRS component until moments before sentence was imposed, and under such
circumstances, preservation is not required.
Family Law Case Summaries:
·
Matter
of Cole v Nofri (CAF 12-00796) – In this custody matter, 4AD reverses
the lower court’s order insofar as it dismissed the mother’s modification
petition on the basis that the mother did not establish a change of
circumstances. 4AD finds that the mother established a change of circumstances,
and that it would be in the best interests of the child to award custody to the
mother. The mother and father both remarried since the original custody trial,
and both parties have had two additional children. The father also has two
step-children who are older than the subject child. The subject child has felt
isolated in the father’s home, has indicated a strong desire to live with the
mother, and the child’s anxiety has progressively worsened to the point that
the child has expressed thoughts of harming the father and his family. 4AD
specifically notes that the child’s extreme anxiety renders this case unique,
and warrants a change in custody, particularly in light of the mother’s
superior ability to provide for the child’s emotional needs.
Martoche, J.,
dissents, finding that there is a sound and substantial basis for the Family
Court’s dismissal of the mother’s modification petition. The dissent notes that
the mother has previously sought modification of the original custody order for
the same reasons. In 2006, a modification petition was dismissed. “Clearly, the
mother has a pattern of alleging that the child is suffering from emotional
disturbances as a result of living with the father.” In addition, the mother
was aware of the child’s anxiety issues prior to the initial custody
determination.
·
Matter
of Rulinsky v West (CAF 11-02192) – In this custody/visitation matter,
4AD affirms the lower court’s order, which terminated visitation between the
child and the incarcerated father. The mother established a change in circumstances.
Since the prior order, the child has matured and has indicated a strong desire
not to visit the father. Also, the lower court found that the father was using
visitation to attempt to reconcile with the mother, rather than to interact
with the child. Although the lower court did not make a determination as to
whether the presumption in favor of visitation was rebutted, 4AD finds sufficient
evidence to enable it to make that determination. Specifically, the father did
not have much prior contact with the child and the child has expressed a desire
not to visit her father.
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