Monday, February 17, 2014

Stats & Case Summaries - Fourth Department Decisions Released on February 14, 2014


Criminal Case Summaries:

·        People v Case (KA 12-01342) – 4AD reverses D’s conviction because the lower court erred in admitting 7 summary exhibits. D was not provided with the data underlying the exhibits before trial, and the exhibits were not based on information that was already in evidence. As a result, they were improperly admitted under the voluminous writings exception to the best evidence rule. D was therefore denied a full and fair opportunity to contest the accuracy of the summary exhibits. (4AD reviewed this error in the interest of justice.) Furthermore, 4AD finds that D was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to review the summary exhibits and object to their admission into evidence. This error was so serious that D was denied a fair trial.

·        People v Heatley (KA 12-02392) – This appeal from a second degree murder conviction produced three separate opinions from the 4AD panel. The majority, concurrence, and dissent all agreed that D did not commit second degree murder, however, they disagreed as to why he did not, and what the proper remedy should be in this case. D argued that his intent to kill was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and his conviction was therefore against the weight of the evidence. (Trial counsel failed to preserve the argument that the evidence was legally insufficient).

The majority agreed that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, because there was legally insufficient evidence of intent to kill. The majority notes that it is well established that as part of an appellate court’s weight of the evidence review, the court must determine whether all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority next concludes that even though the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the proper remedy is a reduction of the murder conviction to manslaughter under CPL 470.15 (2) (a), not dismissal of the indictment.  Although dismissal is the proper remedy where a verdict is found to be against the weight of the evidence, here, according to the majority, the verdict is technically based on legally insufficient evidence. “Where as here, . . . there is no separate contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, but instead the analysis of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is conducted solely in the context of a contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), we conclude that dismissal of the indictment is not the appropriate remedy.” The majority thus modified the murder in the second degree conviction to manslaughter in the first degree.

Smith, J., concurred. The concurrence disagreed that the conviction was based on legally insufficient evidence, and instead found that there was legally sufficient evidence of D’s intent to kill, but that the verdict was nevertheless against the weight of the evidence. The concurrence further concluded that a conviction can be modified where a verdict is found against the weight of the evidence. According to the dissent, CPL 470.20 and 470.15 give an appellate court broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedial measure, and permit the reduction of a count that was against the weight of the evidence to a lesser included offense.

Fahey, J., dissented. The dissent agrees with the majority that there was insufficient evidence to establish D’s intent to kill. But the dissent disagrees that the conviction could be modified. Instead, in the dissent’s view, the Court was required to dismiss the indictment. D asked only for weight of the evidence review, and the Court was thus limited to that type of review. Given the conceptual distinctions between sufficiency and weight review, “I cannot conclude that a court, when asked to determine whether a verdict is justified on the facts (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 493; see also CPL 470.15 [5]), may, on the law, reduce a verdict it deems to be against the weight of the evidence to one convicting a defendant of a lesser included offense.”

·        People v Ingram (KA 13-00437) – 4AD affirms the lower court’s order, which granted D’s motion to suppress physical evidence and oral statements. An officer received a tip from an arrestee that there were guns located behind a particular house in Buffalo, which was located in a high-crime area. Officers proceeded to the area and noticed D and another man in front of one of the neighboring houses. The other man was known to one of the officers as a victim of a recent shooting. As the officers stopped to talk to the other man, D began to quickly walk away. The second officer exited his car and asked D his name. D then began to reach for his jacket pocket and tried to pull something out. The officer drew his gun and D began to run. Police eventually apprehended him and found a gun. 4AD finds that the tip and D’s behavior did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion and police could not lawfully chase and apprehend D. 4AD notes that the tip was not reliable, because the informant did not specify who placed the guns behind the house, or where exactly they were located. In any case, there was also no indication that D had any connection to the house. Finally, when D first reached for his pockets, police did not see a bulge or any tell-tale sign of a weapon.

Scudder, P.J., and Peradotto, J., dissented. The dissent primarily contends that the lower court failed to afford sufficient weight to the fact that D reached for his jacket pocket and “vigorously” tried to pull something out, and that the police officer testified that in his experience, such behavior was normally indicative of the fact that a weapon was present. In the dissent’s view, this behavior plus D’s flight gave rise to a reasonable suspicion.

·        People v Laboy (KA 11-02136) – 4AD reverses D’s conviction of assault in the second degree, among other things, because it was based on legally insufficient evidence. A police officer entered D’s home with the consent of his wife, and attempted to arrest him for harassment in the second degree, a violation. The alleged violation occurred earlier that day, but the officer did not have an arrest warrant. D resisted and caused injury to the officer. 4AD finds that the arrest was unlawful, because the officer did not have reasonable cause to believe that D had committed an offense in her presence. Thus, under Penal Law section 140.10 (1) (a), the officer could not arrest D without a warrant.

·        People v Perry (KA 13-00563) – 4AD reverses the lower court’s order, which dismissed the indictment against D on the ground that the statute of limitations had run. D was charged with grand larceny in the second degree for allegedly stealing New York State retirement benefits that he was not entitled to. He applied for the benefits in 2004 or 2005, and received payments from February 2005 to February 2012. 4AD concludes that the grand larceny was a continuing offense that did not terminate until February 2012, which was when the statute of limitations began running. The prosecution began in March 2012 and was thus timely.

·        People v Sanders (KA 09-02165) – 4AD finds that D’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide was not against the weight of the evidence. D punched the victim with a closed fist in the back of the head, ultimately causing his death. 4AD notes that while death resulting from a single punch may be unusual, it has repeatedly held that a single punch can support a criminally negligent homicide conviction. Here, D rushed the victim and without warning delivered a “powerful blow” to his head. Witnesses described the blow as “a very loud crack, like a wooden bat hitting a ball.” In addition, the Medical Examiner described the victim’s injuries as similar to those suffered by individuals involved in high-speed car crashes.


Family Law Case Summaries:


·        Matter of Bly v Hoffman (CAF 13-00240) – In this custody matter, 4AD reverses the lower court’s order, which dismissed the mother’s modification petition without a hearing. 4AD finds that the mother was deprived of her right to counsel when the Family Court “sua sponte dismissed her petition in the absence of her attorney”. Reversal was required without regard to the merits of the mother’s case.

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