Criminal Case Summaries:
·
People
v Beard (KA 10-01864) – 4AD reverses D’s conviction because the lower
court violated his right to counsel. While an indigent defendant does not have
the right to the appointment of successive lawyers of his own choosing, he may
be entitled to a new lawyer upon a showing of good cause for substitution.
Where a defendant raises a seemingly serious complaint, the trial court is
required to conduct a minimal inquiry regarding the complaint. Here, D informed
the court before jury selection that this was the first time he was able to
speak to the attorney, he was not informed of his trial date, and he was not
told of certain pretrial hearings conducted in his absence. After holding a
bench conference with the lawyers, the court explained to D that the trial
would be going forward. D further complained when the court asked him if he
would like to be present during side-bars and bench conferences. 4AD concludes
that D’s complaints were sufficiently serious and should not have been
summarily dismissed by the lower court, especially because the complaints were
either supported or uncontradicted by the record.
· People
v Bounds (KA 08-01429) – D argued he was denied a fair trial because
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he arranged for the arrest of a woman
who was in the courthouse waiting to testify on D’s behalf. 4AD rejects that
contention, first noting that defense counsel decided not to call the woman as
a witness, and did not establish that her testimony would have been favorable.
The arrest of the witness was lawful and the police did not have to wait until
she testified to arrest her.
· People
v Burnett (KA 08-02248) – 4AD reverses because the lower court erred by
denying D’s request to charge second degree assault as a lesser included
offense of first degree assault. The People conceded that the first prong of
the Glover-Green test was satisfied,
and with respect to the second prong, 4AD finds that the jury could have found
that D intended to cause a physical injury rather than a serious physical
injury, or that he acted recklessly rather than intentionally.
· People
v Diaz (KA 11-00996) – In this SORA matter, the 4AD majority modifies
D’s risk level from level three to level two. The lower court erred by making
an upward departure based on factors that were already taken into account by
the risk assessment instrument. The court also erred by relying on D’s mental
illness, because the record contained no admissible evidence demonstrating D
suffered from a mental illness, or that D’s mental illness was causally related
to his risk of reoffending.
The dissent
(Fahey, J.) argues that while the lower court relied on some factors that were
already accounted for by the risk assessment instrument, D’s mental
illness—schizophrenia—was not accounted for by the RAI. The evidence of D’s
mental illness contained in the unsigned case summary was admissible, because
it met the “reliable hearsay” standard for admissibility in SORA proceedings.
The connection between D’s mental illness and his risk of reoffending implied
in the case summary was neither unduly speculative, nor undermined by other
compelling evidence.
·
People
v Members (KA 08-02020) – 4AD reverses because the lower court erred by
accepting the verdict from 11 jurors. The 12th juror had suffered a seizure
during deliberations late in the day on a Friday, and was taken to the
hospital. D objected to the substitution of an alternate juror and moved for a
mistrial. The lower court took the verdict from the 11 jurors and directed them
to return on Monday morning, when the court would determine whether the missing
juror rendered the same verdict. On Monday morning the missing juror affirmed
his verdict, and the rest of the jurors reaffirmed their verdict. Although
sympathetic to the lower court’s attempt to avoid a mistrial, 4AD explained
that a defendant is entitled to a determination of guilt by 12 jurors. When a
court accepts a verdict, it becomes final and binding. Here, the lower court
could have recessed the proceeding until Monday, or inquired whether D would
waive his right in writing and in open court. Because it did not choose either
option, reversal was required.
· People
v Smart (KA 09-01305) – D was sentenced as a persistent felony offender
for his conviction of second degree burglary to 20 years to life imprisonment.
The 4AD majority modifies the sentence to 15 years to life, explaining that
while second degree burglary is classified as a violent crime, D did not engage
in any violence, and his criminal history is mostly non-violent. The majority
notes that it is modifying only the minimum term of D’s sentence, so that he
has the opportunity to establish whether he has earned the right to parole
sooner.
The dissent
(Scudder, P.J., and Martoche, J.) argues that D has an extensive criminal
history, and, in this case, the People proved by clear and convincing evidence
that D acted to keep a witness against him from testifying. The dissent also
emphasized that the Appellate Division’s power to reduce a sentence should be
exercised only in “unique and narrow circumstances”, and such circumstances
were not present here.
Family Court Case Summaries:
·
Matter
of Burrell v Burrell (CAF 11-01551) – In this custody matter, the lower
court correctly determined that the father established a change in
circumstances to warrant an inquiry into whether a modification of custody
would be in the child’s best interests. The father established that on several
occasions, the mother left the subject child without adult supervision while
she ran errands. The child also indicated to the mother and father that her
step-brother had touched her sexually or inappropriately. While the child’s
statements were not corroborated, the mother enrolled the step-brother into
counseling. Those two things constituted the requisite change in circumstances.
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